There seems to be a lull in this thread, yet not all has been said I'm sure.
I am posting this in this thread because the question and queries that deal with at least four of the items in the first post, and also with the last post by(at the time I composed this)
Unfortunately, the question and the queries and explanations of the questions is long and perhaps tedious, nor are my beliefs tied to it all. It is a question about a conception that I have found no reference to anywhere that I have looked. Whether or not I have exhausted all sources is immaterial from a statistical point of view.
I am placing this question and accompanying baggage without references to any other works simply because I have not found any (and this may be the way it should be). Besides, Copernicus put forth a concept, without a perfect theory of how it could be so. Yet he was right.
The main question is:
Could there be a multiplying effect of the gravity of a body of mass?
By way of explaining what I mean by multiplying effect I imagine the following:
Two bodies of equal mass (called A1, A2), far removed from all other but negligible gravitional effects of other bodies, revolve around their common centre of gravity (or if you will, locked into each other's gravity well at similar positions). The two bodies have used the entirity of their mass to establish this “equilibrium”.
Since these two bodies have used all the gravity that their mass supplies to establish themselves, how would they attract a third body(B) of any size, let alone the one I'm going to conceptualize, without their mass being able to increase its' “attraction abilities” in some manner?
Is the answer to the last question 'The third body(B), travelling on its' way to eternity(or whereever), enters the gravity well(s) of: a) A1 b)A2 c)combined A1,A2 d)none?
(Sorry, I forgot to mention that some of the questions might be multiple choice.)
If either of the first two answers satifies the question to your satifaction skip to the quote at the bottom.
Why would there be a gravity well if both A1 and A2 used up their “attraction abilities” on each other?
If there is a third gravity well (combined A1,A2) that has the power of the sum (or some part of the sum) of the masses of A1 and A2, does this not mean that both A1 and A2 masses have multiplied their gravitational ability? Or have they lost their grip on each other? (or have I lost mine?)
Does anyone have a suggestion that would cause them to choose the answer “d” in the multiple choice question?
Backing up the scenario a bit, I imagine body(B) with a mass equal to either A1 or A2 travelling on a course that will take it through the midpoint of the A1,A2 duality perpendicular to the plane of the orbits of the twain. It is travelling in such a manner that it will pass through the orbital plane and always be equidistant from A1 and A2.
Is there some manner in which body(B) could pass through without disturbing A1 or A2?
If the answer is no, then is the gravity well of B the sole disturbing factor?
Is there some manner in which body(B) could pass through without its manner being changed?
If it is changed then how did the masses of A1 and A2 change it?
That is the last question for now, and if anyone needs to know how this might pertain to the first four items of the original post I will respond later.
Due to the nature of some of the responses that have been posted to this forum in this and other threads I'm including the following quote:
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Fallibilism is the philosophical doctrine that absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible; or at least that all claims to knowledge could, in principle, be mistaken. As a formal doctrine, it is most strongly associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, who used it in his attack on foundationalism, but it is already present in the views of early philosophers, Xenophanes, Socrates and Plato. Another proponent of fallibilism is Karl Popper, who builds his theory of knowledge, critical rationalism, on fallibilistic presuppositions. In recent times, the concept has also been employed by Willard Van Orman Quine to attack the possibility of analytic statements.
Unlike scepticism, fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our knowledge - we needn't have logically conclusive justifications for what we know. Rather, it is an admission that because empirical knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false. Some fallibilists make an exception for things that are axiomatically true (such as mathematical and logical knowledge). Others remain fallibilists about these as well, on the basis that, even if these axiomatic systems are in a sense infallible, we are still capable of error when working with these systems. Moreover, according to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all of mathematics is impossible, That is, even mathematics has its own paradox like the Barber paradox. The theory that it was impossible to know a truth with certainty was the basis of the educational movement lead by people like John Dewey and was called the pragmatist movement.
The critical rationalist Hans Albert demonstrated the impossibility to prove any certain truth even in the fields of logic and mathematics. See his Munchhausen-Trilemma illustrating the hopeless situation to justify all your means to justify any certain truth. Even if fallibilism is inevitable Albert does not fall victim to relativism or scepticism.